Summary of Wilson v. State of Nevada, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 by Gaylord, Tanya
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
11-21-2007
Summary of Wilson v. State of Nevada, 123 Nev.
Adv. Op. No. 54
Tanya Gaylord
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gaylord, Tanya, "Summary of Wilson v. State of Nevada, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54" (2007). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper
470.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/470
Wilson v. State of Nevada,  
123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 (Nov. 21, 2007)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – DOUBLE JEOPARDY  
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from an amended judgment of conviction following a remand post direct appeal.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Vacated the amended judgment and remanded to the district court with instructions to 
reinstate the portions of the original sentence affirmed on direct appeal.  The double jeopardy 
protections prohibit increasing a defendant’s sentence after a partially vacated conviction on 
appeal. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
  
Wiley Gene Wilson was convicted of four counts of using a minor in the production of 
pornography and four counts of possession of a visual representation depicting sexual conduct of 
a person under 16 years of age.  He was sentenced to 4 terms of 24 to 72 months on the 
possession charges to run concurrently with 4 consecutive terms of 10 years to life on the 
production charges.  On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed three of the four 
production charges and remanded the case for resentencing.2  The district court then resentenced 
Wilson but modified the sentences in two ways: (1) by increasing the minimum sentence for 
each possession from 24 months to the statutory maximum of 28 months; and (2) by ruling that 
Wilson’s possession sentences should run consecutively, instead of concurrently, with his 
sentence on the one remaining production count.  Wilson appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether the district court violated 
Wilson’s right against double jeopardy by increasing Wilson’s original sentences on the counts 
affirmed on direct appeal and concluded that his right against double jeopardy was violated.   
 
Double Jeopardy 
 
 The Nevada Constitution mandates that “[n]o person shall be subject to be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense.”3  Wilson based his appeal on the Nevada Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause in Dolby v. State where the Court held that 
“[w]hen a court is forced to vacate an unlawful sentence on one count, the court may not increase 
                                                 
1 By Tanya Gaylord. 
2 Wilson v. State, 121 Nev. 345, 358, 114 P.3d 285, 294 (2005). 
3 NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8(1).  Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (no person “shall ... be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”). 
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a lawful sentence on a separate count.”4  The State argued that the Nevada Supreme Court 
should reconsider its core holding in Dolby because, as a result of the United States Supreme 
Court double jeopardy holdings5 in the last half century, Dolby is no longer a good law.  The 
Nevada Supreme Court refused to accept the State’s argument and affirmed its commitment to
strong double jeopardy protections articulated in D
 
olby. 
                                                
 
Rejection of United States v. DiFrancesco and “sentencing package doctrine” 
  
The United States Supreme Court first considered the application of the double jeopardy 
protection to sentencing in its 1874 landmark decision in Ex Parte Lange.6  In Lange, the 
defendant was convicted of stealing mail bags, a crime punishable by either a fine or a prison 
term.  The defendant, however, was both fined and sentenced to prison.  The Supreme Court 
reversed holding that once Lange suffered one of the punishments allowed under the statute, “the 
power of the court to punish further was gone.”7 
  
In United States v. Benz, the Supreme Court extended Lange to constitutionally prohibit 
increasing a sentence after the defendant had begun to serve it.8  However, between 1947 and 
1980, the Supreme Court gradually retreated from this prohibition.9  In United States v. 
DiFrancesco, the United States Supreme Court completely abandoned the Lange-Benz rationale 
and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits resentencing only when defendants have 
developed a legitimate expectation of finality in their original sentences.10   
 
Following DiFrancesco, the majority of federal courts have held that defendants waive 
any expectation of finality in their original sentences when they exercise their right to an 
appeal.11  In effect, when defendants challenge one of several interdependent sentences (or 
underlying convictions), they have challenged the entire sentence.12  Accordingly, federal courts 
now generally recognize that when a defendant has successfully appealed part of a conviction, 
“the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude increasing the sentence on the remaining offense 
to effectuate the sentencing judge’s original intent, even though the defendant has already begun 
serving the sentence.”13 
  
 
4 Dolby v. State, 106 Nev. 63, 65 (1990). 
5 See Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 30 (1985); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 138-39 
(1980). 
6 85 U.S. 163 (1874). 
7 Id. at 176. 
8 282 U.S. 304, 307-08 (1931). 
9 See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969); Bozza v. United States, 330 
U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947) (no double jeopardy where trial court resentenced defendant to more severe punishment 
where initial sentence was less than the statutory minimum). 
10 449 U.S. at 135. 
11 United States v. Bello, 767 F.2d 1065, 1070 (4th Cir. 1985); see also U.S. v. Bentley, 850 F.2d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 
1988); U.S. v. Shue, 825 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 
1985); McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915, 918 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 950 (3d 
Cir. 1981). 
12 See Busic, 639 F.2d at 947 n. 10. 
13 Bello, 767 F.2d at 1070; see also Bentley, 850 F.2d at 329; Crawford, 769 F.2d at 257; McClain, 676 F.2d at 918; 
Busic, 639 F.2d at 950. 
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In addition, federal courts have developed the “concept of a sentencing package.”14  
Under the sentencing “package” doctrine, courts treat the penalties imposed on multiple counts 
as individual components of a single, comprehensive sentencing plan.15  Accordingly, federal 
courts can let composite sentences in multicount convictions stand or fall in the aggregate and 
have the authority to revise even unchallenged portions of a sentencing “package” without 
violating the double jeopardy protection.16  
 
Nevada double jeopardy jurisprudence 
 
 While recognizing the contradicting developments in the federal double jeopardy 
jurisprudence and the sentencing law, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to 
the traditional rule articulated in Dolby: “When a court is forced to vacate an unlawful sentence 
on one count, the court may not increase a lawful sentence on a separate count.”17  The 
defendant in Dolby was convicted of the attempted murder of an elderly man and sentence to ten
years in prison.  Additionally, the district court imposed a ten-year enhancement based on the 
age of the victim, leading to a total sentence of 20 years.  After the sentencing hearing, Dolby 
brought a motion to vacate the enhanced penalty.  The district court vacated the enhanced 
penalty, but resented Dolby to 20 years on the primary offense of attempted murder.  On app
Dolby argued that the district court violated his double jeopardy protection by increasing his 
original sentence.  The Nevada Supreme Court 
 
eal, 
agreed. 
                                                
  
Application of Dolby to Wilson’s resentencing 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed with the State’s argument that Dolby is no longer 
good law for three reasons.  First, the Court noted that Dolby was an implicit rejection of the 
United States Supreme Court holding in DiFrancesco because Dolby was decided a decade after 
DiFrancesco and by citing cases purportedly overruled by DiFrancesco, Dolby deliberately 
sought to reserve the double jeopardy protections.  Second, the Nevada Supreme Court stated 
that states are free to provide additional constitutional protections beyond the ones provided by 
the United States Constitution and that its decision to adhere to Dolby is consistent with 
Nevada’s past practice of affording more citizen protections under the Nevada Constitution than 
those under the federal Constitution.18  Third, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the State 
failed to offer sound reasons for depleting the increased constitutional protections in Nevada by 
failing to argue, for example, that the “practical realities” of the sentencing in Nevada have 
reached the complexity of the federal sentencing law or by failing to invoke the sentencing 
“package” doctrine.   
 
14 U.S. v. Handa, 122 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1997).  
15 See State v. Saxon, 846 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ohio 2006). 
16 The courts have acknowledged two limitations on their power to resentence.  First, the increased sentences must 
fall within the statutory limitations. Shue, 825 F.2d at 1115.  Second, because a defendant has a legitimate 
expectation that, after appeal, he will not be subject to “a greater sentence than that previously imposed as 
punishment for appealing his conviction,” a district court may not resentence a defendant to a greater aggregate 
sentence after a successful appeal. Id. 
17 106 Nev. at 65; 787 P.2d at 389. 
18 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983) (“States are free to provide greater protections in their criminal 
justice system than the Federal Constitution requires.”). See Miranda v. State, 114 Nev. 385, 387, 956 P.2d 1377, 
1378 (1998); Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 704, 137 P.3d 1095, 1102 (2006). 
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Applying Dolby to Wilson’s case, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that by 
modifying Wilson’s sentence, the district court unconstitutionally increased the lawful sentences 
on the counts affirmed on appeal.  Under the original sentence, Wilson faced an aggregate 
minimum sentence of 40 years to life.  After the district court vacated the three production 
counts, four possession counts and one production count remained and therefore, Wilson should 
have been sentenced to an aggregate minimum sentence of ten years on all remaining counts.19  
However, the district court increased the minimum sentence on the remaining possession counts 
which resulted in Wilson facing an aggregate minimum sentence of 19 years and 4 months.  
Although the resentencing did not lead to a harsher penalty than Wilson’s original sentence, the 
district court’s sentencing procedure to individually increase the minimum terms on the 
remaining possession counts and restructure the relationship between the possession counts and 
the one production count, was forbidden by Dolby. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that the district court’s resentencing on the lawful portions of Wilson’s 
conviction violated Wilson’s double jeopardy rights, vacated the amended sentence, and 
remanded the case for resentencing consistent with the opinion.  The core holding of Dolby 
continues to embody the double jeopardy protections followed in Nevada.  Additionally, the 
Court extended Dolby to apply to resentencing mandated on appeal.   
 
                                                 
19 This minimum aggregate sentence results from running Wilson’s one term of ten years on the production count 
concurrently with four two-year terms on the possession counts (which run concurrently with one another). 
